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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW
The labor cases treated by the Tenth Circuit during the .1977-
78 survey period were of varied importance. Cases of factual inter-
est only will be merely reported. Those of greater legal impact
have received comment to highlight new trends or novel use of
existing principles. The most significant decisions in the labor
law area involved employee benefit trust funds discussed below
in section I(G).
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS ACT'
A. Concerted Activity
In NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., I a driver-salesman, in protest
of a unilateral change in the company bonus payment program,
wrote a letter to his fellow drivers soliciting group support for a
collective refusal to pump gas on certain days. 3 The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that because this was con-
certed activity protected by section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,' the discharge of the employee also violated the statute.
The Tenth Circuit deferred to the decision of the Board that the
letterwriting itself came within the protection of section 7,5 but
felt constrained to consider whether the partial strike activity, if
carried out, would be unprotected, thereby depriving the em-
ployee of the specific protection of section 8(a)(1) and the remedy
of reinstatement.
Guided by the recent Supreme Court mandate to determine
protected partial strike activities on a case-by-case basis,' the
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976).
566 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1977).
The letter described seeming deficiencies in the modified plan and advocated that
the drivers demonstrate solidarity by refusing to pump gas on a given day. If no company
response was forthcoming, the letter proposed the same action be taken on two additional
days. Id. at 682.
4 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
1 566 F.2d at 684. In addition to the NLRB determination, the court observed that
several circuits hold that individual action in soliciting group activity is concerted activity
within the purview of the Act. See, e.g., Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407
F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
566 F.2d at 685, 686. In Local 76, Int'l Aas'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment
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court addressed the instant case in light of the consideration that
work stoppages, unless of a "far-reaching and serious kind," are
generally protected.' After a comprehensive review of court deci-
sions defining protected partial strike activities, the Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that "[in the context of partial strikes, violence
may well be the dividing line between protected and non-
protected activity."' The-court held that the activity, considered
alone or in conjunction with the proposed action, was protected
and granted enforcement of the Board's order.
B. Unfair Labor Practices
In M.S.P. Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 10 the Board found unfair
labor practices where an employer, immediately following an
election in which the union prevailed, laid off several employees
and reduced the working hours of others. Prior to the election, the
company had followed a consistent "no-layoff policy." The em-
ployer asserted that the change in working conditions was justi-
fied by economic necessity. However, the administrative law
judge weighed conflicting testimony and found that the conduct
of the employer was motivated, in whole or material part, by the
purpose to retaliate against its employees for organizational ac-
tivities. The Board ordered reinstatement of two discharged em-
ployees and awarded those employees, as well as three others,
back pay.
The court of appeals honored the fact findings, except as to
a single employee, and approved the standard used by the Board.
In a lengthy opinion, the Tenth Circuit stated that business justi-
fication does not immunize an employer where there is substan-
tial evidence on the record to support an inference of discrimina-
tion." Further, the court found the employer guilty of retaliatory
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), the Supreme Court held that states may not
regulate partial strike activity, thereby overruling UAW Local 232 v. Wis. Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
1 566 F.2d at 686 (citing NLRB v. Leprino Cheese Co., 424 F.2d 184 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 915 (1970)).
566 F.2d at 686.
568 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1977).
568 F.2d at 174 (relying on NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996 (10th
Cir. 1977) and Bill's Coal Co. v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1974) for the proposition
that economic justification is not a per se defense). The Tenth Circuit rejected q stricter
test requiring that discriminatory motive "predominates." 568 F.2d at 174 n.12. See Stone
& Webster Eng'r Corp. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1976).
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conduct toward the two discharged employees of whose union
activity the company was unaware. In the opinion of the court,
this specific knowledge is not requisite where the circumstances
-demonstrate that pervasive anti-union animus motivated the
conduct of the employer."
In NLRB v. MFY Industries, Inc.," the Board applied for an
enforcement order after finding the employer had committed un-
fair labor practices" and had refused to bargain with a certified
bargaining representative. 5 Although decided within long-
established principles of labor law, the case was not without its
points of interest. Following a valid recognition strike by five
boiler engineers, the union won an NLRB supervised election and
was certified as the bargaining agent. The employer rehired one
engineer, whom it designated as a supervisor, and then asserted
that under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Board
Act the employer was under no obligation to bargain with a unit
of only one employee, and certainly not with a unit consisting of
none." The administrative law judge, in an opinion adopted by
the Board, held that the evidence supported finding that the
refusal to reinstate the striking engineers lacked the required le-
gitimate business explanation and thus violated the Act. 7
The Tenth Circuit inquiry found substantial evidence on the
record to support the findings of the Board." The court called
attention to evidence that the employer had employed other engi-
neers on a part-time basis in the absence of the striking engineers.
Further, the court observed that compliance with the city me-
chanical code would require a licensed engineer on duty approxi-
mately ninety-three hours a week, a requirement that could
hardly be filled by a single engineer. The court granted enforce-
ment of the Board's order to include reinstatement with make
whole relief and an order to bargain in good faith.
11 568 F.2d at 176. See Majestic Molded Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1964); see also NLRB v. Brown-Dunkin Co., 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961).
13 573 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1978).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
573 F.2d at 675. See NLRB v. Crispo Cake Cone Co., 464 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1972).
573 F.2d at 675 (citing NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967)).
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), 160(0 (1976).
1979
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C. Interference with Union Activities: The No-Solicitation Rule
In NLRB v. National Jewish Hospital & Research Center,"'
the Tenth Circuit granted enforcement of the Board's orders aris-
ing from the discharge of an employee for violating the employer's
no-solicitation rule. The Board found that the employer's rule,
confining solicitation to "non-work and non-public areas during
non-working time," 20 was overly-broad in violation of the Act.'
Thus, the discharge of the employee for soliciting union support
in public areas of the hospital also violated the Act.
2
1
The Tenth Circuit, observing that it was required to alter a
previously announced view23 which had stressed the public policy
of maintaining a tranquil atmosphere for hospital patients, ad-
hered to the ruling of the Supreme Court recently announced in
NLRB v. Beth Israel Hospital. A In order to strike the necessary
balance between organizational rights guaranteed in the Act and
the medical necessity of controlling solicitation in immediate pa-
tient care areas, the Supreme Court now supports the position of
the NLRB that rigid rules prohibiting solicitation in public areas
of a hospital are illegal. The effect of this decision is that strict
rules against solicitation apply only to patients' rooms, operating
rooms, and places where patients receive treatment, such as
x-ray and therapy rooms.
D. Excluded Class: Agricultural Laborers
In NLRB v. Karl's Farm Dairy, Inc., 5 the Tenth Circuit
rejected the Board's definition of an agricultural worker, and thus
denied protection of the Act 2 to a dairy farm employee dis-
charged for his union activities. The employer owned and oper-
ated a dairy farm and an adjacent retail outlet. The operation
also processed and sold milk from at least one other dairy. The
No. 77-1061 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. Prior to Dec. 1975, the hospital rule permitted no solicitation without approval
of the hospital administrator. The revised rule precluded solicitation except in employee
only lunchrooms and cafeterias, locker rooms, restrooms and parking areas.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
Id. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
13 In the past, the Tenth Circuit has denied enforcement of NLRB orders which
permitted solicitation in areas of a hospital to which patients had access. See St. John's
Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1977).
554 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 2463 (1978).
570 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1978).
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
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Board held that, although the employee worked on a dairy farm,
he was not an exempt agricultural worker2 within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Acts because the employee took
part in processing on the farm of commodities produced by other
dairy farms. Construing the exemption narrowly, in reliance on
previous Tenth Circuit case law,2 the Board maintained that
processing any quantity of foreign milk was sufficient to consti-
tute a "separate commercial operation" and the employee en-
gaged therein nonagricultural30
The court found insufficient evidence in the record before it
that "foreign milk represented more than a de minimus portion
of the company's operation. ",3' In thus denying enforcement of the
Board's order, the Tenth Circuit relied on a broader meaning of
agriculture to draw the distinction between "separate commercial
operation" and "farming" in a primary or secondary sense. When
addressing hybrid operations in the future, the Tenth Circuit will
require substantial evidence on the record that a dairy farm em-
ployee is more than incidentally involved in processing foreign
milk to be characterized as a nonagricultural employee protected
by the Act. 2
E. Remedies
The sole issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit in NLRB v.
Fire Alert Co.,3 was the formula used by the Board for determin-
ing the amount of a backpay award. The facts were uncontested.
27 The NLRA exempts agricultural workers from its cpverage, but contains no defini-
tion of an "agricultural laborer." Since 1960 Congress has directed, by an annual rider to
the Board's appropriation, that Board determinations be guided by the Department of
Labor's interpretation of "agriculture" at § 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
provides definitions. 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (1976).
= 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
" 570 F.2d at 905 (citing NLRB v. Tepper, 297 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1961) for the
proposition that certain dairy workers are nonagricultural employees where products han-
dled by them were produced elsewhere than on employer's farm).
m Generally, the NLRB has concluded that workers who divide their time are covered
by the Act if they regularly perform nonagricultural work, irrespective of the amount of
time spent in the performance of each type of work.
' 570 F.2d at 905.
' Id. at 905, 906 (citing Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977) which
held that truck drivers employed by a poultry farm are "employees" within the coverage
of the NLRA). In the opinion, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the Tepper case, as one
involving a large processing operation which received very substantial amounts of milk
from other farms. Id.
= 566 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1977).
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Following a lawful strike, the union made an unconditional offer,
on behalf of all striking employees, to return to work. The em-
ployer began to recall strikers and to hire outsiders, but failed to
offer reinstatement to two senior employees. The Board held the
employer had discriminated between strikers in violation of the
Act,34 and ordered reinstatement and backpay to the two senior
employees. The Board began to toll backpay from the point in
time when the two senior employees would have been reinstated
to jobs for which they were qualified had the strikers been taken
back in order of seniority. In its challenge to the formula, the
employer maintained that, having no seniority system, it could
reinstate strikers in any order of recall. Further, the employer
maintained that the backpay award predated the first act of dis-
crimination, which the employer asserted was the hiring of out-
siders.
Based on the premise that the discrimination relevant to the
backpay formula was the discrimination between strikers, the
Tenth Circuit upheld the Board's computation of backpay. The
court observed that the employer is allowed to choose among
qualified strikers so long as he acts in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner, such as rehiring based on skill or ability.3 Here, the court
noted, the record contained the underlying suggestion that union
activism was the reason for failure to reinstate. In any event, once
Board proceedings have established that the employer has dis-
criminated between strikers, the court stated the burden is then
on the employer to establish any defenses it may have to the
backpay formula used by the Board.
F. Arbitration
In IBEW v. Professional Hole Drilling, Inc.,31 a building con-
tractor appealed a district court judgment requiring specific per-
formance of an arbitration award made under the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. The contractor asserted he was
no longer under the jurisdiction of the arbitration committee after
his company terminated operation as a sole contractor and en-
tered a joint venture not signatory to the collective bargaining
agreement. The Tenth Circuit, finding that the joint venture ob-
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1976).
566 F.2d at 698 (citing NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)).
574 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978).
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tained the same subcontract held by the sole contractor, held that
the employer was under a continuing. duty to arbitrate as a suc-
cessor employer, 7 in light of the continuity of its obligations and
work force before and after the change of business identity. Fur-
ther, under the facts of this case, there was an expectation created
by the conduct of the employer.8 At no time was the union noti-
fied of the change of business identity or the termination of the
agreement, and, in fact, the contractor had continued to talk with
the union regarding disputes arising under the collective bargain-
ing agreement after entering the joint venture.
In deciding that the arbitration award was enforceable, the
Tenth Circuit applied the two-part standard of review controlling
in arbitration cases. Initially, judicial inquiry must determine
whether, in fact, the parties did agree to arbitrate. If so, the
decision of the arbitrator on the merits is final. Thereafter, review
is strictly confined to whether the arbitrator interpreted and ap-
plied the collective bargaining agreement so that the award is
rooted in the agreement. 9 The Tenth Circuit, stating that "it
would be difficult to find a better example of an arbitrable dis-
pute," 0 granted the deference due a reasoned arbitration award.
The court observed that although the award may have indirect
3' A successor employer may have continuing obligations under the collective bar-
gaining agreement if there is substantial identity between the old company and the
merged business. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). However,
even in merger situations where the predecessor employer has sufficiently disappeared so
as to relieve the successor of liability under the collective bargaining agreement, courts
find the predecessor retains the duty to arbitrate. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local
Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
"The actions of a party to a contract are to be accorded substantial weight in
determining its rights and duties under the contract." 574 F.2d at 501 (citing Fanderlik-
Locke Co. v. United States, 285 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860
(1961).
" The standard of review of arbitration cases and the deference accorded the arbitra-
tion award were enunciated in a series of cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Essentially,
these cases underline the federal policy to encourage collective bargaining and to foster
the use of arbitration to settle labor disputes arising under the collective bargaining
agreements. 574 F.2d at 503 (citing Campo Machinery Co. v. Local 1926, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists, 536 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Butcher Workmen Local 641 v. Capitol
Packing Co., 413 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1969)).
" 574 F.2d at 503.
1979
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consequences for the joint venture, "any tangential effect does
not require interference with the arbitrator's award."',
G. Employee Benefit Trust Funds
In Ader v. Hughes,4" the Tenth Circuit announced its view on
an emerging controversy regarding the role of an impartial um-
pire in trust agreements established under the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA).11 The LMRA mandates that trust
agreements must provide for a court-appointed umpire "in the
event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the admin-
istration of such [trust] fund."" The issue confronting the court
was whether proposed amendments to the trust agreement must
be submitted to an impartial umpire under circumstances
whereby the governing trustees are evenly divided for and against
the amendments." The Tenth Circuit adopted the position that
amending of a trust agreement is not an act of trust fund
"administration" as the word is used in the LMRA, and thus, a
trust agreement may lawfully provide that disputes over proposed
amendments to the trust are nonarbitrable.11
In the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, analysis must begin
with the recognition that the relationship between employer and
employee trustees is quasi-adversarial in nature, thereby necessi-
tating a strong employer presence on the board of trustees to
,1 Id.
'2 570 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1978).
29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1976).
The trust agreements had been amended in the past. Here, two proposed amend-
ments to the trust agreements were supported by all union trustees, and opposed by all
employer trustees. One amendment would require that one employer trustee be appointed
by a particular employer association, where presently that appointment is made by an-
other employer association. The other amendment would require an employer to continue
making contributions to the fund after a labor contract expires. 570 F.2d at 305.
" 570 F.2d at 307-09. The trial court found that the trustees had come to an LMRA
deadlock on the amendments. Further, the trial court determined that appointment of an
umpire was required by interpretation of the specific terms of the trust agreement, provid-
ing for appointment of an impartial umpire whenever the trustees come to a deadlock on
"any question" except those "in connection with the interpretation or enforcement of any
collective bargaining agreement." On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the determina-
tion of the trial court based solely on contract interpretation. Although rejecting the
minority view that the court had broad equity jurisdiction over all aspects of LMRA §
302(c) trusts, the Tenth Circuit retained jurisdiction to consider the state contract inter-
pretation claim together with the federal claim based on the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion. Id.
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safeguard against possible abuses of power by union trustees.47 In
this adversarial setting, the court observed that an impartial
umpire cannot assume the role of a trustee with the power to alter
the relationship of the parties, nor can his impartial judgment
serve as a substitute for the veto of a vigilant employer represent-
ative.
The court noted that the union position, urging a broad
meaning of the word "administration," had been impliedly re-
jected by the Tenth Circuit in Bath v. Pixler,48 which distin-
guished "legal controversy" from the "practical administration of
the trust." In the opinion of the court, permitting an umpire to
decide the legal effect of a particular provision would upset the
balance of rights and duties struck between the employer and
employees, and rewrite the agreement of the parties despite
united protests of employer trustees."9 The court expressed the
view that, under the mandates of the LMRA, an impartial person
must be allowed to assume a trusteelike role only for the limited
purpose of breaking a deadlock on matters of practical trust ad-
ministration so as to permit the trust to go for Aard through im-
passe on ordinary matters.2
In Carpenters and Millwrights Health Benefit Trust Fund v.
Gardineer Dry Walling Co.,5 the Tenth Circuit held that union
membership was immaterial to an employer's contractual obliga-
, Id. at 308 (citing-Asseeiated -Contractors of Essex County v. Laborers Int'l Union
of N. America, 559 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1977)). The NLRB takes the contrary position that
the trustees, unlike collective bargaining agents, are bound to exercise their independent
judgment and act solely in the interests of the fund beneficiaries, not the parties who have
appointed them. Central Fla. Sheetmetal Contractors Ass'n, NLRB LAB. L RzP. (CCH)
19,107 (March 31, 1978). See Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that trustees of pension fund have a duty to exercise their independent judgment as
fiduciaries in administering trust funds. The standard for review of decisions made by
trustees then becomes whether decisions can be described as arbitrary and capricious).
283 F.Supp. 632 (D. Colo. 1968).
570 F.2d at 307.
The question remains: Will this opinion affect the decision of the impartial umpire?
In dicta, the court noted that, while the legality of the amendments was not an issue in
this case, the amendment dealing with employer-trustee appointments is an attempt at
union participation in the choice of an employer-representative, participation which has
been forbidden elsewhere as contrary to the scheme of the LMRA. Id. at 309. See Asso-
ciated Contractors, Inc. of Essex County v. Laborers Int'l Union of N. America, 559 F.2d
222 (3d Cir. 1977); Quad City Builders Asa'n v. Tri City Bricklayers Union 7, 431 F.2d
999 (8th Cir. 1970).
51 573 F.2d 1172 (10th Cir. 1978).
1979
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tion to make contributions to several employee benefit trust
funds.12 The employer's construction agreements governed the
"Building Construction Industry" and did not differentiate be-
tween residential and commercial construction employees. The
employer sought to establish that industry practice dictated the
use of separate agreements for residential as compared to com-
mercial building construction employees, with only the latter cov-
ered by the agreements negotiated between the union and the
employer. The appellate court determined that the unsigned
trust instruments referred to in the collective bargaining agree-
ments53 were designed to benefit all employees of all employers
that contributed to the fund. Thus, the Tenth Circuit held the
comprehensive agreements, fixing the employer's obligation to
contribute fully and unconditionally, applied to residential and
commercial construction employees, irrespective of union mem-
bership.14 Further, the court held that the trustees have no duty
to prove damages to the trust. The formula for damages is the
sum of contributions the employer should have made for all its
employees during the period in question."
United Steel Workers Local 2098 v. International Systems &
Controls Corp.," involved the rights of employees following plant
closure to a pension trust fund created under a collective bargain-
ing agreement.57 Language in the pension agreement provided
that employees who had not met the eligibility requirements for
retirement58 had no right or interest in the pension fund. The
Tenth Circuit held that this specific language defeated any claim
asserted by employees to a present vested interest in the fund
prior to actual retirement. The court recognized that the pension
fund was not a mere gratuity but a type of deferred compensa-
u Jurisdiction over this matter was granted by 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 301 (1976).
" 573 F.2d at 1175-76 (citing Local Nine, IUOE v. Siegrist Constr. Co., 458 F.2d 1313
(10th Cir. 1972), which held that the obligation to contribute arises upon signing of the
collective bargaining agreement and may continue beyond the expiration of the agre
ment).
" 573 F.2d at 1177 (citing Manning v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1974),
which held that employer was obligated to make contributions to a trust fund for nonunion
employees who performed work covered by the collective bargaining agreement).
" 573 F.2d at 1176 (citing A to Z Rental, Inc v. Wilson, 403 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1969)).
566 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1977).
"7 Jurisdiction over this matter was granted by 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 301 (1976).
" Eligibility requirements for the pension were attainment of the age of 65 years with
15 years continuous service. 566 F.2d at 1136.
VOL. 56
LABOR LAW
tion,55 despite the fact that employees made no contribution to
the trust fund, nor did the employer fund the trust until such
time as a given employee became eligible to retire. However, in
the view of the appellate court, the extent of any compensation
owed to employees is limited by the terms of the contract. There-
fore, the court of appeals affirmed the granting of summary judg-
ment to the employer, thereby holding that no employee, prior to
actual retirement under the conditions of eligibility for pension
benefits, had any vested interest in pension benefits or trust cor-
pus either under the agreement, or pursuant to quasi-contract. 0
H. Federal Preemption
In Continental Oil Co. v. State of Oklahoma," the Tenth
Circuit refrained from determining its position on an unsettled
point of law soon to be addressed by the Supreme Court. An
employer sought a ruling that the Oklahoma Employment Secu-
rity Act,' 2 to the extent that it provides for compensation benefits
to employees "locked out" by the employer after a lawful strike,
is in direct conflict with bargaining rights protected by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act" and therefore is void by the doctrines
of federal preemption and the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion.64 The Tenth Circuit declined to reach the merits, but ob-
served that the claim of unconstitutionality falls within the issues
addressed by the Second Circuit in New York Telephone Co. v.
New York State Department of Labor,5 currently before the Su-
69 Id. at 1138 (citing Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975); Knoll v.
Phoenix Steel Corp., 465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); and
Schneider v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1972)).
" 566 F.2d at 1139. But see Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223
(7th Cir. 1977), cert granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978). In this recent Seventh Circuit case,
the appellate court held that a union member's interest in a pension plan was a "security"
for purposes of antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §
77(q)a (1976), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976). The court determined that an employee's right to receive benefits, as a form of
compensation, from an employer-funded pension plan was sufficient to constitute a
"security" even though it would only mature upon the happening of *certain events in the
future.
, 574 F.2d 1016 (10th Cir. 1978).
" OKLA. STAT. Trr. 40, § 215(e)(3) (1971).
' 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976).
U.S. CONST. art. VI. Although federal preemption is a strong doctrine, state regula-
tion of industrial practices is allowable if related to local health and safety. The protection
afforded this species of state legislation may shelter the payments to strikers, as it has
other legislation regulating conditions of employment, such as wage and hour regulations.
6 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
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preme Court on certiorari. In that case, the court of appeals up-
held a New York statute which provided for unemployment bene-
fits to striking workers."
In the Tenth Circuit case, the trial court, noting the em-
ployer's concurrent action in the state court, had dismissed with
prejudice the employer's claim based on the abstention doc-
trine. 7 The appellate court found nothing in the record to warrant
this severe action by the lower court. Thus, the Tenth Circuit
ordered a remand to consider whether the doctrine of abstention
has present application, and if so, to consider the alternative
suggested by the employer that the federal action be held in
abeyance pending determination of the state law question by the
state tribunal. In light of the consideration that two years had
lapsed since the action by the trial court and that both parties
had fully argued the question of constitutionality, the remand
encompassed directions to consider the merits of this claim in
light of current circumstances.
II. LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT 9
In Usery v. District 22, UMW,7 0 the Tenth Circuit denied a
union member's motion to intervene in election certification pro-
U After a lengthy review of legislative history, the Second Circuit concluded that
Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation of genuine employment compensation
to strikers as a form of legitimate social policy. The public policy underlying the New York
statute is declared to be as follows:
"Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, wel-
fare, and morale of the people of this state." 566 F.2d at 393 n.5 (citing N.Y. LAB. LAw
§ 501 (1977)). The Director of the Unemployment Insurance Division of the New York
Department of Labor testified at trial that the three most important objectives of the
statute were: (1) to "cushion the economy" by keeping in circulation money which the
strikers would ordinarily spend on food, housing and the like; (2) to aid the strikers to
pay essential expenses; and (3) to maintain a labor force for the struck employer until
the strike is over. 566 F.2d at 363 n.5.
The First Circuit, which considered the point of law in two cases but found the record
inadequate to decide the issue, considered the critical questions to be: (1) whether the
payments reflect a "deeply rooted state interest;" and (2) assuming such a state interest,
is there too great a frustration of federal purpose to leave the parties as it finds them to
permit the free play of economic forces. Grinnell Corp. v- Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858 (1973); ITT Lamp Div. v Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
6 574 F.2d 1019 (citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964)).
574 F.2d at 1019.
" 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1976).
567 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1978).
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ceedings initiated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to provi-
sions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA). Seeking to challenge the certification of a supervised
election for union officers," the deposed incumbent asserted
grounds previously investigated by the Secretary and determined
to be without merit.7 3 The Tenth Circuit concluded that certifica-
tion of election results is encompassed within the principle of
limited intervention enunciated in Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers," which governs in election challenges. Thus, the court
ruled, the LMRDA,75 by granting "exclusive" post-election reme-
dies to the Secretary, bars individual union members from initi-
ating by intervention grounds already screened and eliminated by
the Secretary.71 The court observed that the provision for exclu-
sive enforcement bythe Secretary is an important device for elim-
inating frivolous complaints and consolidating meritorious ones,
thereby "avoiding continuous challenges and their attendant de-
lays."" The screening mechanisms established in the LMRDA
cannot be circumvented by a deposed candidate seeking to vindi-
cate his own personal interest, the court of appeals stated.
II. FAIr LABOR STANDARDS ACT
78
In Marshall v. Security Bank and Trust Co., 79 the Tenth
Circuit rejected the standard used by the lower court to deter-
mine whether a bank's pay disparity between sexes violated the
" 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1976). The LMRDA, known as the Landrum-Griffith Act of
1959, regulates the internal affairs of labor unions.
A prior election was set aside as invalid. See Usery v. Local 22, UMW, 543 F.2d
744 (10th Cir. 1976).
567 F.2d at. 973. The court of appeals noted that the challenges by the deposed
incumbent were considered very carefully by the Secretary, and thereafter reviewed by
the district court. The reasons given for the Secretary's determination were held to be
sufficient in light of the controlling criteria (citing Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560
(1975)).
" 404 U.S. 528 (1972). In 7Tbovich, the Supreme Court held that the LMRDA does
not bar a union member from intervening in an election challenge to the extent that the
intervention seeks to present evidence and arguments in support of the Secretary's com-
plaint.
, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1976).
7 567 F.2d at 975, 976.
Id. (citing Brennan v. Silvergate Dist. Lodge 50, IAM, 503 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1974),
and the dissenting opinion of Judge Kalodner in Hodgson v. Carpenters Resilient Flooring
Local 2212, 457 F.2d 1364, 1371-72 (3d Cir. 1972).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
572 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1978).
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equal pay for equal work provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) .8 The trial court found that, although the employer
had no formal training program, the pay differential was appro-
priate as to certain male tellers and supervisors who had extra
and different duties and were being trained in all aspects of the
banking business for future placement in managerial positions."'
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a training program, if
bona fide, constitutes an exception to the FLSA. 2 However, the
court noted promotional opportunities and subjective employer
evaluations, standing alone, are not equivalent to a "bona fide
training program," and indeed, are immaterial factors in an equal
pay suit." In the absence of a "bona fide training program," the
Tenth Circuit held that the sole issue presented was whether, in
fact, there was unequal pay for essentially equal work. The court
of appeals termed the trial court's findings inadequate and re-
manded with directions to limit the issue as prescribed in the
opinion.
In Usery v. Fisher,I the Secretary of Labor sought to enforce
a consent decree by means of civil contempt proceedings. By the
terms of the consent decree, Fisher had agreed to pay his employ-
ees sums due for past violations of the minimum wage and over-
time compensation provisions of the FLSA."5 The trial court had
denied the Secretary's petition for enforcement, reasoning that
the consent decree was in effect a "money judgment," and that,
by virtue of the federal statute"8 and the provisions of the Colo-
rado Constitution proscribing imprisonment for debt, "7 the trial
29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d)(1), 215(a)(2) (1976).
572 F.2d at 278.
92 29 U.S.C. § 213 provides that definitions will be found in regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor. In the Secretary's interpretation of the provisions relating to
training programs, a "bona fide training program" constitutes an exception to the FLSA.
29 C.F.R. § 800.148 (1978).
10 572 F.2d at 279 (citing Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 05th
Cir. 1974)).
" 565 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1977).
0 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1976).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2007(a) provides, in pertinent part: "A person shall not be impri,;ole
for debt on a writ of execution or other process issued from a court of the United States
in any State wherein imprisonment for debt has been abolished."
"7 COLO. CONST., art. II, § 12, provides as follows: "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt, unless upon refusal to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his creditors in such
manner as shall be prescribed by law, or in cases of tort or where there is a strong
presumption of fraud."
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court had no authority to adjudge Fisher in contempt of court for
his default on installments due under the consent decree. The
trial court alternatively concluded that, even if it had discretion-
ary authority to hold Fisher in contempt, it would not do so
because the Secretary had not resorted to execution or garnish-
ment to enforce its money judgment.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a consent decree,
entered into to resolve violations of the FLSA, is purely equitable
in nature, in light of its dual purpose to remedy economic in-
jury to employees and to correct an offense against the public
interest. "Should Fisher be held in civil contempt and im-
prisoned," the court stated, "it would not be imprisonment for
debt, but rather for his failure to comply with an order of court." 8
Thus, the Tenth Circuit adopted the majority view that district
courts not only have the power but the duty to compel back pay
orders in civil contempt proceedings, the "proper means for en-
suring compliance"'" with the FLSA.
Jan Bernstein
0 565 F.2d at 139.
"Id.
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